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Abstract
Financing companies’ quality of corporate gov-
ernance is one of the important factors to financing, 
because it can has an effect on payment risk or an un-
payment, hence, we can state that the quality of cor-
porate governance will influence on financing cost. 
Corporate governance causes to reduce the financing 
crisis risk. This problem is very important, when this 
risk leads to create more expenses. So, corporate gov-
ernance causes to reduce the investing costs, and in 
conclusion increases the value of company. Naturally, 
the quality of corporate governance leads to create 
trust and reliance in investors and reduces their infor-
mational risk and surely will influence on companies 
financing cost. The main purpose of this study is to 
investigate the effect of corporate governance, share-
holders control, independence of directorate on the 
financing cost of listed companies in Tehran Stock Ex-
change during 5 years (since 2006 to 2013).The popu-
lation is 448 companies that 221 companies had been 
selected with Chochran method. The result of this 
research indicates that corporate governance has not 
significantly effect on the companies financing cost.
Keywords: company size, corporate gover-
nance, financing cost
Introduction
Since 10 years ago, the world observed impor-
tant changes in private sector, economic growth 
and create job. Because many countries had fol-
lowed the market-exist attitude, so awareness from 
the importance of private organizations in ground 
of people comfort increased. When economics con-
sider the private sector in entirely world, corporate 
governance has had more important in advance.
Corporate governance is a system that companies 
control and lead the structure of corporate governance 
clears. The salary distribute and responsibilities between 
different sectors in company, the same as members of 
board directors, managers shareholders of others inter-
ests, assignment and decision–making rules (Gul and 
Tsui 2001) supported the effectiveness of corporate gov-
ernance particularities as a supervision system.
Corporate governance defines as a process, cus-
toms, politics, rules and organizations that affect the 
way of company from leading control; in other hand, 
it defines as a clear structure and corporate operation, 
responsibility of managers and the members of board 
of directors other than shareholders and the assignment 
of company other than employees. Loan holder, goods 
suppliers and local societies that company work there.
Ashbaugh et al, has been defined corporate gov-
ernance as a set of processes that reduce representa-
tive risk through increasing the supervision on execu-
tive actions, restricting their speculative behavior and 
improving the quality of published information of 
firms. The recent financial crisis in America, Europe 
and Asia is clears for all countries that why the sub-
ject of transparency and accountability in corporate 
governance, in investors’ confidence and the perform 
of national economy are important. Corporate gov-
ernance is related to the mechanisms that companies 
worked and were controlled with their help.
While governments shape the legal, institutional 
and regulatory area to create a strategy systems for 
institutions which have a major role, the primary 
responsibility of establishing the desirable system is 
the obligation of private sector. Such system makes 
sure that companies operate in the interests of so-
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ciety and cause investors’ confidence and attract 
long-term capitals.(Hoseeini ,2007).
Costs of financing of business activities are the 
concern of many of activists. Financing costs may be 
prepare with merchant or his/her partners personal 
properties and/or by bank loan and co-operation with 
active companies in the field of financial, that the suc-
cessful merchant accepts the combination of both.
(Raymond Neveu, 1995). So, the costs of financing 
can be calculated using debts such as bank loans and 
issuance of stock. It seems that corporate governance 
can affect the cost of financing of companies.
Research Theoretical Foundation
Suitable corporate governance which requires 
the board of directs with any structure, focuses on 
long-term issues and doesn’t involve itself in the 
more daily operational responsibilities. In general 
the board of directs and its members should have 
predetermined specific responsibilities and have a 
good motivational stimulus in order to properly per-
form (Hasass Yeganeh and Moradi 2007).
According to agency theory, the presence of inde-
pendent nonexecutive directors, managers that do not 
have execute responsibility in the company and their 
supervisory performance as an independent persons, 
cause to reduce the conflicts between shareholder and 
managers. The findings of Wen et al (2002) has shown 
that firms with more nonexecutive directors, due to 
more effective supervision on managers activities for 
financing ,they less pay attention to debts; negative rela-
tionship between debt and the ratio of board of directors 
and nonexecutive director. But, the findings of Berger et 
al (1997) and Abor (2007) indicated a positive relation-
ship between the dispositions to debt in the structure of 
company’s capital. Anderson et al (2004) found a nega-
tive relationship between the percentage of board of di-
rector’s nonexecutive director and financing cost.
Fama and Jenson (1983) found that nonexecu-
tive director has this motion in order to preserve 
their credit capital and they can be more effective 
supervision and because of their independence, they 
affect on company management ratio to executive 
director, and protect the interests of shareholders 
against management opportunism.
Ashbaugh et al (2006) had shown with better non-
executive director, opportunism of managers lowered, 
thus risk and cost of common stock declines. Another 
mechanism of corporate governance is institutional 
investors that can be supervision on company man-
agement, because they can have considerable influ-
ence on company management and also can manage 
the benefit of management and shareholders. Ways 
that shareholders can be supervision to management, 
generally define on agency theory framework.
According to Bushee (1998), he defined that in-
stitutional shareholders are major investors such as 
banks, insurance companies, investment companies, 
funds from theoretical approach, and the position of 
institutional shareholders in corporate governance is 
very complex. Institutional shareholders are effective 
measure to improve the corporate of companies and 
they are powerful controller at supervision to use cor-
porate governance principles; therefore, it is expected 
that their presence causes improvement of corporate, 
enhance effective supervision on management and 
the value for shareholders.
Ahmad-poor et al (2010) investigated the effect 
of corporate governance and audit quality on financ-
ing cost. They showed that the efficient supervision 
of board of director doesn’t have effect on financing 
cost and on the other hand the quality of corporate 
governance through institutional shareholder which 
is effectives on companies financing cost.
Nooravesh et al (2009) investigated the relation-
ship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and agency cost of listed companies on the Tehran 
Stock Exchange. In this study, they investigated the 
effect of corporate governance and audit quality on 
financing cost. They represented the costs of agency 
as a function of interaction between growth oppor-
tunities and Tobin free cash flows. Index was defined 
as a measure to the growth opportunities. The re-
sults of samples, include 88 companies during 2003 
to 2006, indicated that between the number of non-
executive members of board of directs and the per-
centage of institutional investors with agency costs, 
there were a negative and meaningful relationship.
Mashayehk Smaili (2006) investigated the rela-
tionship between profit quality and some aspects of 
guiding principles such as the percentage of board 
directs members and the number of nonexecutive 
directors in listed companies in the Tehran Stock 
Exchange profit quality which has been tested with 
accrual items measure.
In general, this study states that the number of 
nonexecutive directors and the percentage of board of 
directors members that are the mechanisms of guiding 
principles don’t have any important role in improving 
the profit quality in the Tehran Stock Exchange.
Ahmad-poor et al., (2009) investigated the ef-
fect of nonexecutive directors and institutional in-
vestors as supervisory tools of corporate governance 
Social science section
1577 Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com 
on profit management. The results of their investi-
gation showed that when incentive to manipulate of 
profit is high, nonexecutive directors and major in-
stitutional investors have weak role in reducing the 
abnormal of uncommon accrual items.
Fortin and Pittman (2007) investigated the 
number of American firms during 1977 to 1988 in 
terms of the effect of auditor’s reputation on fi-
nancing cost during nine years, the companies that 
have been registered on exchange commission; they 
found companies that hired the large audit institu-
tions, and the average of their financing cost is lower.
Anderson (2004) as accounting report and fi-
nancing cost in his research on 500 companies dur-
ing 1993 to 1998 showed financing cost inversely has 
relations with board of directs independence, Board 
of directs size, and nonexecutive directors members 
of audit committee and number and size of board of 
directs meetings. Another study as the effect of cor-
porate governance on firm credit rate was done to 
this study that they stated that company’s debt rate 
positively related to board of directs independence, 
ownership of board of directs stock. 
Research hypothesis
Because of investigating the effect of corporate 
governance on financing cost, the main hypothesis 
formulated as follows:
There is a significant relationship between cor-
porate governance quality and financing cost.
Because in this study, corporate governance 
include control shareholders, existence of Board 
of directs independence, major institutional share-
holders, thus there are three sub-hypotheses;
Hypothesis 1: There is significant relationship 
between control shareholders existence and financ-
ing cost.
Hypothesis 2: There is significant relationship 
between Boards of directs independence and fi-
nancing cost.
Hypothesis 3: There is significant relationship 
between major institutional shareholders existence 
and financing cost.
Materials and methods
 This study, from data gathering method is de-
scriptive, Causal comparative and the target is ap-
plied. This study directed towards practical applica-
tion of known ledge. Also, the classification is based 
on a method and nature is a kind of correlation re-
search. As noted above, this type of research is the 
investigation of events, it means, the research studied 
the possible cause and effect relationships through 
observation of existing conditions, and in this meth-
od the cases of study occurred in the past and they are 
not able to manipulated by the researcher.
The population is all of Tehran Stock Exchange 
listed companies. To select the sample, the follow-
ing criteria have been considered:
1. before 1385 to be accepted in Tehran Stock 
Exchange and till the end of 1390 to be active.
2. In order, comparable information, companies 
during the study period didn’t have any changes in fiscal 
period and their end of year to be Esfand (February).
3. In order to homogenize information, compa-
nies don’t invest the financial brokerages including 
insurance and bank.
4. After pay attention to above criteria, 221 firms 
were eligible for statistical community that 140 firms 
during 1385 to 1390 among the population of re-
search have been selected randomly.
Methods of data collection
In this study, the method of data gathering was 
library method hat essays and documents relating 
to study and audited financial statements of com-
panies, financial reports and companion notes that 
published with Tehran Stock Exchange have been 
studied these types of data which are secondary data 
and are reliable and valid; the tools of data gathering 
in this study is documented survey. Tools that used 
to gathering data including observation, statistical 
tests, databases and Excel and EVEIWS software.
The information about literature and theoretical 
debates were collected from library resources such 
as books, Persian and English periodicals and in-
ternet sites. Methods of data analysis and definition 
of variables in this study for data analysis have been 
used for two methods.
Descriptive and inferential statistics
In descriptive statistic, mean, variance and standard 
deviation and inferential statistic, Pearson correlation 
factor, t- test, F-test, in multiple regression method 
with Panel Data were used to examine research model. 
In order to efficiently estimate, a regression model with 
Panel Data is needed by using appropriate tests, which 
one of the common effects, fixed effects and random ef-
fects can be selected for this purpose to choose common 
effects models and fixed effects have been used for F-
test. If we select fixed effects, we have to use Hasuman 
test to select between fixed effects and random effects. 
If the results of F test verify by using the common ef-
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fects method, Hasuman test is not needed the model 
estimated with common effects.
In this research, to check the independence of 
regression model errors was used Watson test and to 
accept or reject the main hypothesis of research, the 
Student test was used.
To test the hypothesis research multiple regres-
sion model will be used.
i t 1 i t 2 i t 3 i t 4 i t i tDebtCost Control BrdInd InstBlock LnAssets0 β β β β β ε= + + + + +
Debt cost 
it
: Cost of debt of i firm in t year
Control: Control shareholders
BrdInd: Independence of board of directs
InStblock: Major institutional shareholder
LnAsset 
it
: size of i firm in t year
ε
it
: the error for i firm in t year
Dependent variables
Costs of financing of business activities are the 
concern of many of activists. Financing costs may be 
prepared with merchant or his/her partners person-
al properties and/or by bank loan and co-operation 
with active companies in the field of financial, that 
the successful merchant accepts the combination of 
both choose.(Raymond P.Neveu 1374[5]. So, costs 
of financing can be calculated through using debts 
such as bank loans and issuance of stock. It seems 
that corporate governance can affect the cost of fi-
nancing of companies. Financing cost in this study 
is equal to the ratio of financing cost with the total 
of long- term and short- term receivable facilities of 
companies.
Independent Variables
In this study, corporate governance and its char-
acteristics includes existence of control sharehold-
ers, shareholders that have more than 50 percents 
of voting shares independence in board of directs, 
the ratio of nonexecutive directors to executive di-
rectors in board of directors, existence of major 
institutional shareholders, which are more than 50 
percents of common stock.
Existence of control shareholders
With regard to the matter 103/88/86 and 
amendment in date 1347/12/24, If person or per-
sons have more than 50 percent’s of firms stock, 
they can choose the members of board of directs 
to manage the firms, but the shareholders have less 
than 50 percent’s of firm’s stock, and they can in-
volve only one or more persons of board of directs. 
In this study, if person or company has ownership 
more than 50 percents of voting stock, we consider 1 
and otherwise we consider 0 (zero).
Independence of Board of directs (the ratio of 
nonexecutive members to executive members of 
Board of directs)
Board of directs shall have at least 3 nonexecutive 
members until the members can influence on deci-
sions of board of directs; in this study if the nonex-
ecutive members to be more then executive members 
we considered 1 and otherwise we considered zero.
Major institutional shareholders
Generally, imagination that the presence of in-
stitutional investors may lead to changes the behav-
ior and policies of companies. This work leads form 
regulatory activities of investors. In this study, if in-
stitutional shareholders have more than 50 percent’s 
of company with common stock, we considered 1 
and otherwise we considered zero.
Control Variable
LNASSETS, (size of company): calculated with 
natural logarithm of total assets of the sample.
Results
Statistical tests
As the result of table (1) shows, the P-Value of 
F Limer test is equal to 0.000. As a result, the com-
mon effects method rejected. Results of F Limer test 
showed that the common effects method is not ap-
propriate for estimating the regression models. So, 
the Hausman test uses to select estimate appropriate 
method. The P-value of Hausman test shows that the 
fixed method is a better option for estimated model.
 
The results of testing hypotheses
The results of regression model that has been done 
with fixed effects method, showed in table 2. P-value 
statistic of F fisher test is equal to 0.000and it means 
that model has overall adequacy. Adjusted R-squared 
is equal 0.8315 and it indicates that more than 83 per-
cent’s of independent variable changes explained with 
independent and control variables .Statistic of Dor 
bin-Watson is (2.0576) indicates that there is no error 
in component of correlation. The first sub-hypothesis, 
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Table 1.The results of F test and Hausman test
TestsTest statisticDegrees of freedomp-valueTest Result
F Limer test4.4088139.6960.0000Fixed effects method
Hausman test35.795240.0000Fixed effects method
existence of control shareholders examined with fi-
nancing cost; As Table 2 shows the first sub-hypothe-
sis, the variable of existence of control shareholders has 
a significant coefficient of 0.2428, and the acceptable 
error level is 5 percent’s, thus, It’s represented that be-
tween existences of control shareholder and financing 
cost of listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange, 
there is no significant relationship.
As a result, the first sub-hypothesis is not con-
firmed. In the second sub-hypothesis, the relation-
ship between independence of board of directs and 
financing cost is examined, according to table 2, the 
coefficient of significant level of independence of 
board of directs is 0.0125, and the acceptable error 
level is 5 percent. Thus, it’s represented that there 
is no significant relationship between independence 
of board of directs and financing cost of listed com-
panies in Tehran Stock Exchange. As a result, the 
second sub-hypothesis is not confirmed, too. In 
the third sub-hypothesis, the relationship between 
existences of major institutional shareholders with 
financing cost is examined. Existence of major insti-
tutional shareholders coefficient of significant level 
is 0.0022, and the acceptable error level is 5 percent. 
Thus, it’s represented that there is a significant re-
lationship between the existences of institutional 
shareholders with financing cost of listed companies 
in Tehran Stock Exchange, as a result, the third sub-
hypothesis confirmed. The result of control vari-
ables has been showed that between the variable of 
size of company (LnAssets) with financing cost has 
a significant positive relationship.
Table 2. Regression Results
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.3088 -11.4302 0.0000
CONTROL -0.0046 -1.1690 0.2428
BRDIND -0.0041 -2.5054 0.0125
INSTBLOCK -0.0437 -3.0789 0.0022
LNASSETS_ 0.0370 20.1229 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared  0.8315
F-statistic  29.9520
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000
Durbin-Watson stat  2.0576
Conclusions
The results of the study showed that in the Teh-
ran Stock Exchange, among three characteristics of 
corporate governance, existence of control share-
holders, independence of board directs, exchange 
of major institutional shareholders, only existence 
of major institutional shareholders influences on 
financing cost, on the other hand, in the Tehran 
Stock Exchange, creditors only existence of major 
institutional governance considered.
Corporate governance is the set of control and 
leading mechanisms of companies. corporate gover-
nance system determines the distribution rights and 
responsibilities of various interests of companies such 
as managers, employees shareholders, and other legal 
entities that were influenced from companies activi-
ties in this system, that rules and procedures determine 
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decisions process at the company and specify tools to 
reach the goals and planning the control systems with 
financial resource suppliers to insure the return of their 
capitals use which they have a close relationship.
Thus, the powerful corporate governance causes 
that companies provide more quality and transparent 
information that it causes to decrease the information 
risk of creditors and as a result it influences the financ-
ing cost of companies. The results indicated that there is 
no significant relationship between existence of control 
shareholders and independence of board of directs with 
financing cost but between the major of institutional 
shareholders with financing cost of debts, there is a sig-
nificant relationship, and the results of this study doesn’t 
correlated with the results of Ashbugh-skife(2006). Ac-
cording to Ashbugh-skife’s finding (2006) , the effect 
of corporate governance on firms credit rate was stated 
that companies debt rate positively related to board of 
directs independence, ownership of board of directs 
stock, also with the results of Anderson’s study, that 
showed the inverse relation between financing cost 
and independence of board of directs aren’t consistent 
with the results of this study. Ahmad poor, Malekiyan, 
and Kurd tabar (2009) found that the incentive to ma-
nipulate of profit is high nonexecutive directors and the 
major institutional shareholders have weak role in the 
reduction of abnormally of accrual items.
Also, the results of Nooravesh, karami, vafi 
sani(2009), about the relationship between corpo-
rate governance mechanisms and agency cost of 
listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange 
indicated that there were a negative and meaning 
relationship between the number of nonexecutive 
members of board of directs and the percentage of 
institutional investors with agency costs. 
In additional, based on the result of Noravesh 
and Kord Tabar (2005), companies with high degree 
of institutional ownership ratio to companies with 
low degree of institutional ownership, reflect grater 
future earning in stock price.
Suggestions based on research results
According to the result of third sub-hypothesis that 
has been confirmed, it seems that existence of major 
institutional shareholders in the combination of com-
pany’s shareholders, as one of the important variables of 
corporate governance, on financing cost, is better that to 
accept more the major institutional shareholders.
Also, the breakdown of company’s value to an-
nual, monthly, and investigation the of relationship 
of each of these components with financing cost of 
listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange may af-
fect on financing cost.
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